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Abstract
We consider Kleinberg’s celebrated small world graph model [12,13], in which a D-dimensional
grid {0, . . . , n − 1}D is augmented with a constant number of additional unidirectional edges
leaving each node. These long range edges are determined at random according to a probability
distribution (the augmenting distribution), which is the same for each node. Kleinberg suggested
using the inverse D-th power distribution, in which node v is the long range contact of node u
with a probability proportional to ‖u− v‖1−D. He showed that such an augmenting distribution
allows to route a message efficiently in the resulting random graph: The greedy algorithm, where
in each intermediate node the message travels over a link that brings the message closest to the
target w.r.t. the Manhattan distance, finds a path of expected length O
(
(log n)2
)
between any
two nodes. In this paper we prove that greedy routing does not perform asymptotically better
for any uniform and isotropic augmenting distribution, i. e., the probability that node u has a
particular long range contact v is independent of the labels of u and v and only a function of
‖u− v‖1.
In order to obtain the result, we introduce a novel proof technique: We define a so-called
budget game, in which a token travels over a game board, from one end to the other, while the
player manages a “probability budget”. In each round, the player “bets” part of her remaining
probability budget on step sizes. A step size is chosen at random according to a probability
distribution of the player’s bet. The token then makes progress as determined by the chosen
step size, while some of the player’s bet is removed from her probability budget. We prove a
tight lower bound for such a budget game, and then obtain a lower bound for greedy routing in
the D-dimensional grid by a reduction.
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1. Introduction
In 2000, Kleinberg proposed his celebrated small world graph model to study the performance
of decentralized search in augmented networks [12, 13]. His original network model was based on
an n × n grid with vertex set {(x, y) : x, y ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}}, and the Manhattan (or lattice)
distance as a distance metric. (I. e., the distance between two points u = (x, y) and u′ = (x′, y′) is
‖u− u′‖1 = |x − x′| + |y − y′|.) For some constant p, every node u has a directed edge to every
other node v within distance p (v is a local contact of u). In addition, for some universal constants
r, q, every node u has q additional directed edges to other nodes, called long range contacts. The
long range contacts of u are determined by q independent random trials, where a particular node
v is chosen according to the inverse r-th power distribution, i. e., with probability proportional
to ‖u, v‖1−r. Kleinberg showed that in such a network with r = 2 and p = q = 1 a simple
decentralized routing algorithm can efficiently route a message from any given source to any given
target. More precisely, he proposed the greedy algorithm, where in each intermediate node the
message travels over a link whose endpoint minimizes the remaining Manhattan distance to the
target. Kleinberg showed that this algorithm yields a route of expected length O
(
(log n)2
)
. This
result can be generalized to D dimensions for any constant D ≥ 1: In this case, the expected greedy
routing length is quadratic in log n if r = D. The parameter r = D is in fact optimal, as for r 6= D
no decentralized algorithm can find a route in poly-logarithmic time (see also [14]).
Following Kleinberg’s seminal work, more general models were studied, and over the last decade a
rich theory of decentralized algorithms and their performance in augmented networks was devel-
oped. (See for example the surveys by Fraigniaud [6] and Kleinberg [15].) An augmented network,
as defined in its general form for example by Fraigniaud, Lebhar, and Lotker [8], consists of a di-
rected base graph of N nodes which defines the local contacts of nodes, together with a probability
distribution for long range contacts, called augmenting distribution. An instance of an augmented
network is a random graph which has all the vertices and directed edges from the base graph as well
as additional directed long range edges from each node to its long range contacts, which are chosen
at random according to the augmenting distribution. Usually, a distance metric is associated with
the network. The distance between two nodes can be, for example, the length of the shortest path
between them on the base graph. For algorithmic purposes, the distance between nodes is expected
to be easy to compute or to approximate locally [6]. The augmenting distribution is usually uniform
and isotropic in the sense that the probability that node u has a particular long range contact v
does not depend on the labels of u and v, but only on the distance from u to v.
Uniform isotropic augmented networks were first considered by Watts and Strogatz [20] as a math-
ematical model to understand the “small-world phenomenon” occurring in social networks and the
web. The most prominent example of the phenomenon is the existence of short chains of acquain-
tances, or “six degrees of separation”, between individuals in the United States, as observed in
Milgram’s famous experiment [18].
While earlier work, including that of Watts and Strogatz’s, was concerned with structural prop-
erties of augmented networks, Kleinberg [12, 13] started to study the question of navigability, i. e.,
whether short paths can be found efficiently in augmented networks. He suggested using decentral-
ized algorithms for routing messages. In such algorithms routing decisions are made locally: The
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node that holds the message determines the (local or long range) contact to send the message to,
using only local information. The message holder can use knowledge about the base graph, the
location of the target on the base graph, and the locations and long-range contacts of nodes that
have come in contact with the messages. However, the message holder has no information about
the long range contacts of nodes that have not yet touched the message.
The simplest, most natural and consequently best studied decentralized algorithm is the greedy
algorithm, in which the message holder passes the message on to its local or long range contact
which is closest to the target (according to the distance metric associated with the base graph).
This led to the definition of the greedy diameter of an augmented graph, which is the maximum
of the expected routing times of all pairs of source and target nodes in the base graph [8]. Aspnes,
Diamadi, and Shah [1] observed the usefulness of greedy routing in augmented graphs for peer-to-
peer networks; several peer-to-peer systems such as Chord [9, 19], Symphony [16] or Randomized-
Chord [11, 21] are based on augmented rings. In all those systems the augmenting distribution is
based on the inverse r-th power distribution, and the expected greedy routing time between any
pair of nodes is O
(
(log n)2
)
(or O
(
(log n)2/k
)
if the number of long range contacts per node, k, is
super-constant but logarithmic).
This raised the question whether there exist uniform and isotropic augmenting distributions that
yield faster greedy routing times. Several attempts were made to find an answer to this question,
but until now succeeded only in restricted settings. In fact, general lower bounds obtained in the
past hold only for the one-dimensional case, where the base graph is the line or the ring: Flam-
mini, Moscardelli, Navarra, and Pe´rennes [5] showed an optimal lower bound of Ω((log n)2) for
the “oblivious diameter” of the augmented line with an augmenting distribution that satisfies a
monotonicity requirement. (The oblivious diameter is a measure that is potentially larger than
the greedy diameter.) A tight lower bound for the greedy diameter of the augmented ring, where
the augmenting distribution is the r-th power distribution with r = 1, was obtained by Barrie`re,
Fraigniaud, Kranakis, and Krizanc [2]. Almost tight lower bounds for all uniform and isotropic
augmenting distributions were provided by Aspnes, Diamadi, Shah [1] and were subsequently im-
proved by Giakkoupis and Hadzilacos [10]. Tight lower bounds for the greedy diameter of the line
of length n with one long range contact per node were obtained by Dietzfelbinger, Rowe, Wegener,
and Woelfel [3]. Finally, Dietzfelbinger and Woelfel [4] proved a tight lower bound of Ω
(
(log n)2/k
)
for the greedy routing time between randomly chosen start and target nodes for the augmented
ring and line with k = O(log n) long range contacts per node. (The lower bound also holds if the
source and target nodes are chosen at random.)
1.1. Results
In contrast to the one-dimensional case, no very general lower bounds were known for the two-
dimensional or even higher dimensional case. Kleinberg [13] proved a lower bound of nΩ(1) for the
expected routing time of any decentralized algorithm in the augmented two-dimensional grid, if
the augmenting distribution is the inverse r-th power distribution for r 6= 2. The result extends
to the D-dimensional case if r 6= D. In the D-dimensional grid augmented with the inverse D-th
power distribution, the greedy diameter is Θ
(
(log n)2
)
, i. e., Kleinberg’s upper bound is tight [7,17].
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Similar lower bounds hold also if the D-dimensional torus (i. e., the grid with wrap-around links)
is used as a base graph.
We are not aware of any lower bounds for general uniform and isotropic augmenting distributions
in the D-dimensional grid or torus for D ≥ 2. This raises the question whether for D ≥ 2 the
inverse D-th power distribution is in fact optimal among all uniform and isotropic augmenting
distributions. In this paper we answer the question in the affirmative. More precisely, we consider
as a base graph the D-dimensional torus {0, . . . , n − 1}D with N = nD nodes. We show for any
such augmenting distribution and any two nodes s, t with ‖s− t‖1 ≤ n/4 that the expected greedy
routing time from s to t is Ω
(
(log ‖s− t‖1)2
)
. The same is true for the D-dimensional grid as a
base graph, as long as s and t have distance at least 2 ‖s− t‖1 from the border of the grid.
Note that the restriction of isotropy is necessary for such a strong lower bound: It prevents us from
defining for some given pair (s, t) an augmenting distribution, where there is always a short greedy
route from s to t (for example, because s has long range contact t with probability 1). On the other
hand, non-isotropic but uniform augmenting distributions might still have a large greedy diameter.
For simplicity of exposition, we consider only the case that every node has one long range contact.
It is not hard to see that our lower bound extends to the case where every node has a constant
number of long range contacts chosen independently at random according to the same augmenting
distribution. Similarly, the lower bound result is not affected if in the base graph any two nodes
within Manhattan distance p are connected, where p is some constant.
Note that the lower bound holds for any source/target pair in the higher dimensional torus or
grid. This is not the case for D = 1 (where the base graph is a ring or a line): For example the
augmenting distribution may have the property that each node has a long range contact at distance
n/2 with high probability. If this is the case, the expected greedy routing time can be very small if
the distance between the source and target is exactly n/2. In higher dimensions this cannot happen,
as for a given distance d and a given node u there are sufficiently many choices of possible long
range contacts v with ‖u− v‖1 = d.
1.2. The Lower Bound Technique
The lower bound proofs for the one-dimensional case were of increasing difficulty. The result by
Dietzfelbinger et al. [3] uses a quite complicated potential function. The lower bound in [4] is based
on an argument that with each step made by the greedy routing algorithm associates a cost and
shows that the expected cost per step is constant, while the total cost of an entire run is Ω(log2 n).
Both the potential function of [3] and the cost function of [4] are rather difficult to motivate and
lead to verifiable but not very intuitive proofs.
The proof presented in this paper is quite different from any previous lower bound techniques we
know of, and in particular from those used in the one-dimensional case [1,3, 4,10]. We also believe
that it is significantly more intuitive, and, while technically challenging, the general approach can
be motivated more easily.
We define a probabilistic game, called budget game, played in rounds by a single player. Then we
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prove a lower bound on the expected number of rounds it takes the player to finish the game.
Finally we show that the expected number of rounds is a lower bound for the expected routing
time in the D-dimensional torus. The lower bound for the budget game is proved by induction. The
inductive hypothesis can be motivated easily. The inductive step is somewhat involved, but not too
hard to verify. The biggest problem to overcome in the course of building the overall argument was
in designing the game, tuning its details, and choosing its parameters in such a way that both the
proof of the lower bound and the proof of the connection with the routing time goes through.
The budget game is played on a game board with d0 +1 spaces, labeled d0, d0−1, . . . , 0 from left to
right. The player starts with a token at the leftmost space, d0, and her goal is to move the token to
space 0 in as few rounds as possible. The player also manages a probability budget. In each round,
the player “bets” a probability distribution β over {1, . . . , d}, where d is the current location of the
token. The total bet on step sizes larger than 1 must not exceed her remaining probability budget,
B, i. e., β
(
[2, d]
) ≤ B. Moreover, in order to prevent the token from moving too fast, bets on step
sizes larger than d/2 are also constrained. Now a step size i is chosen at random according to β, and
the player can move her token i positions to the right. The player loses a portion of her probability
budget, which is determined by how much she bet on step sizes larger than i/2 and by the amount
of progress made (relative to the remaining distance).
The connection to greedy routing on a grid is as follows: The remaining distance the player has to
travel on the game board corresponds to the distance on the grid between the message holder, u,
and the target. The remaining probability budget, B, corresponds to the probability that u has a
long range contact which is closer to the target than u itself. The bet β of a player is determined by
the augmenting distribution: β(i) is roughly the probability that u has a long range contact v whose
distance to the target is by i smaller than u’s distance to the target. As the message gets closer to
its target, longer distances of long range contacts become useless. The probability of choosing long
range contacts which are “too far away” is captured in the budget game by the budget loss.
The constraint in the budget game on bets on large step sizes, i. e., step sizes larger than d/2,
is justified by the isotropy of the augmenting distribution and the topology of the base graph:
Suppose on the D-dimensional torus the message holder, u, is in distance d of the target node.
Even if the augmenting distribution dictates that the randomly chosen long range contact v of u
is with probability 1 in the “optimal” distance from node u (whatever distance is optimal), the
probability that v will not be closer than d/4 to the target is constant. This is because all nodes at
the same distance from u will be chosen with the same probability as long range contacts and only
a constant fraction of them can be closer than d/4 to the target. More generally, u’s long range
contact will be closer than d′ ≤ d/2 to the target only with probability O(d′/d).
There is quite some flexibility in defining the probability budget game precisely, i. e., how big the
budget loss is in each step and how to constrain bets on step sizes larger than d/2. We chose those
parameters in such a way that it fits our application, but we believe that the general concept of a
budget game is interesting in its own right.
In Section 2, we describe the budget game in more detail and analyze it. In Section 3 we prove the
lower bound for the greedy routing time in augmented grids by showing that each distribution on
the long range contacts gives rise to a strategy for the budget game, so that routing times translate
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into upper bounds on the expected time for the budget game. So our lower bound for the budget
game leads to a lower bound for the routing situation.
Throughout the text, “ln” denotes the natural logarithm (to base e) and “log” denotes the logarithm
to base 2. For ease of notation we write logc x instead of (log x)c and lnc x instead of (lnx)c.
2. The Budget Game
The budget game is played in rounds on the set {0, 1, . . . , d0} as “gameboard”. There are two
parameters: d is the remaining distance to be covered, and B is the remaining budget. The “player”
starts with a token at distance d = d0 and wishes it to reach 0. She manages a budget, which
initially has value B = B0. In a round, within the limits of the current budget and obeying some
other restrictions the player can choose (“bet”) probabilities for certain distances to appear. A step
size i is chosen at random, according to these probabilities. Then the distance d is reduced by the
chosen value i, and the budget B is reduced by an amount that depends on the jump distance i
and on the probabilities used in the betting.
Our goal is to establish lower bounds on the expected number of moves needed when starting in d0
with budget B0.
More precisely, when in state (d,B), one round of the game comprises the following actions.
1. The player chooses a valid bet for budget B and distance d, which is a probability distribution
β over step sizes {1, . . . , d}, satisfying the following constraints:
(B1) β([2, d]) ≤ B;
(B2) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d∗ = dd/2e = d− bd/2c:
β
(
[d− j + 1, d])
β
(
[d− d∗ + 1, d]) ≤ 2jd∗ .
The first constraint bounds the probability of choosing step sizes larger than 1 by the remain-
ing probability budget. The second constraint bounds the conditional probability of choosing
a very large step size (close to the remaining distance d) given that the step size is at least half
the remaining distance d. Note that the probabilities for step sizes up to d− d∗ = bd/2c are
not constrained; for example, a strategy in which a step size of bd/2c occurs with probability
1 is allowed. (Such a strategy would not be very efficient, though, as the probability budget
would get reduced by a constant in one step.)
2. A random step size i is chosen from {1, . . . , d} according to the probability distribution β.
3. Progress: Let d = d− i.
4. Budget loss: If i ≥ 2, let B = B−(i/d)3/2β((i/2, d]).1 (For i = 1 the budget loss is 0.)
1For real numbers x < y the interval (x, y] is {i ∈ N | x < i ≤ y}; similarly for closed intervals [x, y].
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This budget loss depends on the “order of magnitude” of the jump i actually chosen. The
amount the player loses is determined by the total amount bet on the jump sizes in this order
of magnitude and larger. If i is close to d, a constant fraction of this is lost; if i is smaller
than d by a factor of q, the loss is scaled down by a factor of q3/2. The basic idea would be to
collect a fraction of q of the amount bet, to reflect the idea that 1/q jumps with a distance
of about d/i would suffice to reach the goal, so that no budget for jumps of this order of
magnitude is needed anymore. For technical reasons the formula is modified a little.
The game ends when d becomes 0.
Note that there is no budget loss in case the step size i is 1, but the player makes progress in this
case, too. Hence, even when the player runs out of budget she can still finish the game; the worst
case time is d0. We assume the player has chosen a strategy S that for each combination (d,B)
dictates which distribution to choose in Step 1. Of course, the idea is that this strategy is chosen
so as to keep the expected number of rounds until d = 0 is reached as small as possible.
We give an example for a strategy. Say the initial budget is B0 = 1. In distance d the player bets
1/ log(d0) on distance bd/2c and nothing on other distances. Since the expected waiting time for
a jump with i = bd/2c is 1/ log(d0), and since after log(d0) such jumps the remaining distance d
cannot be larger than 2, the expected number of rounds is smaller than log2(d0) + 2.
2.1. The main theorem
We assume that B0 ≥ 1. (This will be justified by the applications.) The following theorem is the
first main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Assume the budget game is started with distance d0 and a starting budget B0 ≥ 1,
using an arbitrary fixed strategy S. Then the expected number of rounds is Ω(log2(d0)/B0).
For 1 ≤ d ≤ n and B ≥ 1 let Td,B denote the expected number of rounds until state 0 is reached
when the budget game is run with strategy S, starting in distance d with budget B. Theorem 1
states that Td0,B0 = Ω
(
log2(d0)/B0
)
.
For proving the theorem, we proceed by induction. The following lemma formulates the inductive
assertion. It is convenient to use the natural logarithm, here.
Lemma 2 (Main Lemma) There is a constant α > 0 such that Td,B ≥ α · ln2(d)/(1 +B), for all
d ≥ 1 and all B ≥ 0.
Due to the assumption B0 ≥ 1 in Theorem 1, the theorem is immediately implied by the Main
Lemma. The offset by 1 in the denominator of the lower bound in the induction hypothesis (which
does not occur in the corresponding lower bound of Theorem 1) is necessary. In fact, since the
budget game always finishes after O(d0) rounds, the theorem would not hold if we allowed very
small values of B0, e. g., for B0 = o(ln
2(d0)/d0).
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The lemma is true for d = 1, as T1,B = 1 > 0. By choosing α appropriately we may even say that
it is true for 1 ≤ d ≤ dbase for any fixed dbase. The induction step is involved: all of the following
subsection is devoted to it. The reader interested mainly in the application to the routing lower
bound can safely skip this proof on first reading and continue with Sect. 3.
2.2. The inductive step
It is obvious that the expected number of steps of the budget game for an optimal strategy and
the lower bound stated in the Main Lemma are monotone decreasing in B. On the other hand, it
is not clear (and we will never use) that the expected number of steps of the game for an optimal
strategy is monotone in d.
Consider a distance d ≥ 2 with remaining budget B ≥ 0. Let L = blog dc.
Suppose strategy S dictates that in state (d,B) the player chooses the valid bet β. Recall that
if step size i ∈ {2, . . . , d − 1} is chosen, the budget B decreases by (i/d)3/2β((i/2, d]), and the
remaining distance is d− i. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, the remaining time is at least
α · ln2(d− i)
1 +B − (i/d)3/2β((i/2, d]) , for 2 ≤ i < d.
If step size i = 1 is chosen, the budget remains B and the remaining distance is i − 1. For i = d,
the remaining time is 0. Hence, the inductive assertion for d follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 3 There is a constant α > 0 such that for any budget B ≥ 0, distance d ≥ 2, and bet β
valid in state (d,B) we have
1 + β(1) · α · ln
2(d− 1)
1 +B
+
∑
2≤i<d
β(i) · α · ln
2(d− i)
1 +B − (i/d)3/2β((i/2, d]) ≥ α · ln2(d)1 +B .
The term 1 on the left hand side corresponds to the step that is being made in state (d,B) and
leads to a new state d − i. The other terms in the sum are the lower bounds (as asserted by the
induction hypothesis) for the remaining number of steps for each step size i, each multiplied with
the probability that a steps of size i is made. There is no term for i = d, as after a step of size d
the game ends.
In the remainder of this subsection we prove Lemma 3.
First note that for all d ≥ 2 we have ln2(d)− ln2(d− 1) < 1. Since β(1) ≤ 1 and B ≥ 0, we obtain
1
2
+ β(1)
α · ln2(d− 1)
1 +B
≥ β(1)α · ln
2(d)
1 +B
for α ≤ 1/2.
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Thus, to prove Lemma 3 it suffices to show that
1
2
+
∑
2≤i<d
β(i) · α · ln
2(d− i)
1 +B − (i/d)3/2 · β((i/2, d])
≥ (1− β(1))α · ln2(d)
1 +B
, for sufficiently small α > 0. (1)
If β(1) = 1, the right hand side evaluates to 0, so the claim is true. Thus, in the following we assume
β(1) < 1.
We merge step sizes into orders of magnitude and consider the resulting probabilities, g`, that a
step size is of the order of magnitude `:
g` := β
(( d
2`+1
,
d
2`
])
, for ` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}.
(Note that d/2L = d/2blog dc ∈ [1, 2), and so gL−1 = β
(
[2, d/2L−2]
)
.)
Suppose step size i ∈ {2, . . . , d−1} is applied. Then for ` = blog(d/i)c, we have i/2 = d/2log(d/i)+1 ≤
d/2`+1 and i/d = 1/2log(d/i) ≥ 1/2`+1. Hence, we can bound the budget loss from below as follows
(note that many terms are omitted!):
(i/d)3/2 · β((i/2, d]) ≥ g`
23(`+1)/2
. (2)
The new distance is
d− i ≥ d− d/2`. (3)
Note that ln2(z(1− x)) ≥ ln2(z) − 3x(ln z) for all z ≥ 1 and all x ∈ [0, 12 ] (see Claim 10 in the
appendix). Thus, for ` ≥ 1,
ln2(d− d/2`) = ln2(d(1− 1/2`)) ≥ ln2(d)− 3(ln d)/2`. (4)
Hence, for each ` ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1} we have
∑
d/2`+1<i≤d/2`
β(i) · α · ln
2(d− i)
1 +B − (i/d)3/2 · β((i/2, d]) (2)≥ ∑
d/2`+1<i≤d/2`
β(i) · α · ln
2(d− d/2`)
1 +B − g`/23(`+1)/2
= g` · α · ln
2(d− d/2`)
1 +B − g`/23(`+1)/2)
.
(4)
≥ α · g` · (ln d) · ln d− 3/2
`
1 +B − g`/23(`+1)/2
. (5)
For ` = 0 we need a stronger bound on the expectation of ln2(d− i), which relies on the bound on
the probability of obtaining large step sizes imposed by (B2). We derive such a bound using the
following claim.
Claim 4 Let d∗ = d − bd/2c and let µ be an arbitrary probability distribution on {0, . . . , d∗ − 1}
with the property that µ({0, . . . , j − 1}) ≤ 2j/d∗, for 1 ≤ j ≤ d∗. Then∑
1≤i<d∗
µ(i) ln2(i) ≥ ln2(d)−O(ln d). (6)
9
Proof: Since ln2(i) is increasing in i, the sum is minimal if µ puts as much weight as possible on
the smallest numbers in {0, . . . , d∗− 1}. By the inequality µ({0, . . . , j − 1}) ≤ 2j/d∗ it is clear that
the distribution
µ(i) =

2
d∗
, if 0 ≤ i < (d∗ − 1)/2,
1
d∗
, if d∗ is odd and i = (d∗ − 1)/2,
0 , if (d∗ − 1)/2 < i < d∗,
will achieve this minimum. Thus∑
1≤i<d∗
µ(i) ln2(i) ≥ 2
d∗
·
∑
1≤i<(d∗−1)/2
ln2(i). (7)
We assume that d ≥ 3 and that d∗ is even (and hence i < d∗/2 if and only if i < (d∗ − 1)/2); the
calculation for odd d∗ is similar. Utilizing that ln2(x) is increasing in x we may easily bound the
last sum from below by comparing it with an integral, as follows.
∑
1≤i<d∗/2
ln2(i) ≥
∫ d∗/2
1
ln2(x) dx− ln2(d∗/2)
=
[
x ln2(x)− 2x lnx+ 2x]d∗/2
1
− 2 ln2(d∗/2)
= (d∗/2) ln2(d∗/2)− d∗ ln(d∗/2) + (d∗ − 2− 2 ln2(d∗/2))
≥ (d∗/2) ln2(d∗/2)− d∗ ln(d∗/2).
In combination with (7) we obtain∑
1≤i<d∗
µ(i) ln2(i) > ln2(d∗/2)− 2 ln(d∗/2).
Now d∗/2 ≥ d/4, and hence ln2(d∗/2)− 2 ln(d∗/2) ≥ ln2(d/4)− 2 ln(d/4) > ln2(d)− 2(ln 4)(ln d)−
2 ln d = ln2(d)−O(ln d). Thus Claim 4 is proved.
Let d∗ = d− bd/2c. Recall that g0 = β
(
(d/2, d]
)
= β
(
[bd/2c+ 1, d]) = β([d− d∗ + 1, d]). We define
a probability distribution µ on {0, . . . , d∗ − 1} by µ(i) = β(d − i)/g0. According to property (B2)
µ satisfies
µ
(
[0, j − 1]) = β([d− j + 1, d])
g0
≤ 2j
d∗
for 1 ≤ j ≤ d∗.
Hence we can apply Claim 4 to see that there is a constant C ′ (the same one for all d, B, and all
valid budget bets β), such that
g0 · (ln d)(ln d− C ′) ≤ g0 ·
∑
1≤i<d∗
µ(i) · ln2(i) =
∑
d−d∗<j≤d−1
g0 · µ(d− j) · ln2(d− j)
=
∑
bd/2c<j<d
β(j) · ln2(d− j) =
∑
d/2<j<d
β(j) · ln2(d− j). (8)
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Let C := max{3, C ′}. We bound the sum on the left hand side of (1) from below by grouping terms
according to order of magnitude of the corresponding step sizes and by applying (8) for group ` = 0
and (5) for all other groups. (In order to bound the denominator for group ` = 0 we use relation
(2).)
∑
2≤i<d
β(i) · α · ln
2(d− i)
1 +B − (i/d)3/2 · β((i/2, d])
≥ α · g0 · (ln d) · ln d− C
′
1 +B − g0/23/2
+
∑
1≤`≤L−1
α · g` · (ln d) · ln d− 3/2
`
1 +B − g`/23(`+1)/2
≥ α · (ln d) ·
∑
0≤`≤L−1
g` · ln d− C/2
`
1 +B − g`/23(`+1)/2
(9)
Applying this to (1), we see that to prove Lemma 3 it suffices to show
Z :=
1
2
+ α · (ln d) ·
∑
0≤`<L
g` · ln d− C/2
`
1 +B − g`/23(`+1)/2
− (1 − β(1))α · ln2(d)
1 +B
≥ 0. (10)
Let γ` = g`/
(
1 − β(1)) for ` = 0, . . . , L − 1 and let y = (1 + B)/(1 − β(1)). (Recall that we need
only consider the case β(1) < 1.) Then y ≥ 1 and g` = γ` · (1 +B)/y, and so it suffices to show that
Z ′ ≥ 0, where
Z ′ := Z · y
α · ln d =
y
2α · ln d +
∑
0≤`<L
γ` · (1 +B) · ln d− C/2
`
1 +B − γ`(1 +B)/(y · 23(`+1)/2)
− ln d
=
y
2α · ln d +
∑
0≤`<L
γ` · ln d− C/2
`
1− γ`/(23(`+1)/2y)
− ln d. (11)
Recall that ∑
0≤`<L
g` = β
(
[2, d]
)
= 1− β(1).
Hence
∑
0≤`<L γ` = 1, and so
ln d =
∑
0≤`<L
γ` · ln d. (12)
Note also that
1 +
γ`
23(`+1)/2y
≤ 3/2 for all 0 ≤ ` < L, (13)
because y ≥ 1 and γ` ≤ 1. Moreover, 1/(1− x) ≥ 1 + x for all real numbers x < 1, and using this
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inequality for x = γ`/(2
3(`+1)/2y) yields
Z ′
(12)
≥ y
2α · ln d +
∑
0≤`<L
γ`
((
ln d− C
2`
)(
1 +
γ`
23(`+1)/2y
)
− ln d
)
=
y
2α · ln d +
∑
0≤`<L
γ`
(
γ` ln d
23(`+1)/2y
− C
2`
(
1 +
γ`
23(`+1)/2y
))
(13)
≥ y
2α · ln d +
ln d
23/2y
∑
0≤`<L
γ`
2
23`/2
− 3C
2
∑
0≤`<L
γ`
2`
. (14)
A lower bound for the second summand can be obtained using the following inequality, which is
proved using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Claim 5 Let x1, . . . , xm ∈ R. Then( ∑
1≤i≤m
xi
2i
)2 ≤ (2 +√2) · ∑
1≤i≤m
xi
2
23i/2
.
Proof: Recall that the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality states( ∑
1≤i≤m
aibi
)2 ≤ ( ∑
1≤i≤m
ai
2
)
·
( ∑
1≤i≤m
bi
2
)
for arbitrary reals a1, b1, . . . , am, bm. Define ai = xi/2
3i/4 and bi = 1/2
i/4. Then( ∑
1≤i≤m
xi
2i
)2
=
( ∑
1≤i≤m
aibi
)2 ≤ ( ∑
1≤i≤m
ai
2
)
·
( ∑
1≤i≤m
bi
2
)
=
( ∑
1≤i≤m
xi
2
23i/2
)( ∑
1≤i≤m
1
2i/2
)
.
The claim now follows immediately from the geometric series∑
1≤i≤m
1
2i/2
<
∑
i≥1
1
2i/2
=
1/
√
2
1− 1/√2 = 2 +
√
2.
Applying Claim 5 to the sum in the second term of (14) we obtain
∑
0≤`<L
γ`
2
23`/2
≥
 ∑
0≤`<L
γ`/2
`
2 · 1
2 +
√
2
.
Hence, defining S =
∑
0≤`<L γ`/2
` and using that 23/2 · (2 +√2) = 9.6568 . . . < 10, we obtain
Z ′ ≥ y
2α · ln d +
ln d
23/2(2 +
√
2)y
 ∑
0≤`<L
γ`
2`
2 − 3C
2
∑
0≤`<L
γ`
2`
>
y
2α · ln d +
ln d
10y
· S2 − 3C
2
· S. (15)
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Clearly, neither y/(2α ln d) nor ln d/(10y) are negative. If y ≥ 3CSα ln d, then y/(2α ln d) ≥ 3CS/2
and so Z ′ ≥ 0. Thus, it suffices to consider y < 3CSα ln d. In this case
Z ′ ≥ ln d
30CSα · ln d · S
2 − 3C
2
S = S · C · 3
2
(
1
α · 45 · C2 − 1
)
.
This term is non-negative for α ≤ 1/ (45 · C2). This completes the proof of Lemma 3, and thus the
induction step in the proof of Theorem 1.
3. Application to Greedy Routing in Small-World Graphs
3.1. Greedy routing on a grid
Consider the D-dimensional infinite grid ZD, for D ≥ 2. The distance measure used is the “Man-
hattan distance” induced by the “Manhattan norm”
‖(x1, . . . , xD)‖1 = |x1|+ · · ·+ |xD|.
Fix some distribution λ over ZD, which we will call the long range contact (short: lrc) distance
distribution. Every node u on ZD has a long range contact that is determined by the following
random experiment (executed independently for all nodes u): First, a distance r is picked according
to the lrc distance distribution λ, and then u’s long range contact is chosen uniformly at random
among all nodes v with ‖u− v‖1 = r. (The combination of these experiments defines the augmenting
distribution.) We consider the directed random graph in which every node in ZD has one outgoing
edge to each of its neighbors on the grid, and one edge to its long range contact.
We are interested in the expected greedy-routing time from an arbitrarily fixed source node, s,
to a fixed target node, t. The greedy-routing time is the length of the path from s to t that is
obtained by following in each step the edge that minimizes the Manhattan distance to t (ties
broken arbitrarily). For symmetry reasons we may assume w.l.o.g. that t = 0D = (0, . . . , 0). Our
main result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Let λ be an arbitrary lrc distance distribution. Assume ZD is augmented with long
range contacts chosen according to λ. Then for every starting node s ∈ ZD the expected greedy
routing time from s to 0D is Ω
(
log2 ‖s‖1
)
.
Remark 1 For simplicity we formulate the theorem in terms of the infinite grid, but it applies
equally well to the D-dimensional finite grid GD = {0, . . . , n − 1}D with edge length n (with the
edges induced from ZD and the Manhattan distance measure) and the D-dimensional finite torus
TD = {0, . . . , n− 1}D (with the edges of GD plus “wraparound edges” from (x1, . . . , n− 1, . . . , xD)
to (x1, . . . , 0, . . . , xD), and the shortest path distance). The statements carry over directly as long
as s and t have distance smaller than n/4 (on TD) and have distance at least 2 ‖s− t‖1 from the
border of the grid (on GD).
The rest of this section shows how to utilize Theorem 1 to prove Theorem 6.
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3.2. Simulation of routing by a budget game
To prove Theorem 6, we wish to apply our results for the budget game to greedy routing. As
an intermediate step, we introduce a game G, played in rounds on ZD, which generalizes greedy
routing. The state of game G is a distance d ∈ N; the initial state is some d0. When in state d > 0,
the player chooses a point u ∈ ZD with ‖u‖1 = d arbitrarily. Then, using the lrc distribution λ as
described above, she carries out a random experiment to obtain a long range contact v of u. The
round ends with the new state being d′ = min{‖v‖1 , d − 1}. The game ends once state d = 0 has
been reached. The cost of a run of G is the number of rounds carried out.
A strategy for the player is a function that for each distance d gives some vertex u with ‖u‖1 = d.
If the player adheres to a fixed strategy for choosing u in each step, the cost becomes a random
variable that only depends on the random experiments used for finding the long range contacts. An
optimal strategy is one that minimizes the expected cost. (For given λ, an optimal strategy can be
determined by induction on d = 0, 1, 2, . . ..)
It is obvious that if game G is played starting from d0 with an optimal strategy, then the expected
cost (i. e., the expected number of rounds until the game ends) is not larger than the expected
greedy routing time in ZD from any start node at distance d0 to 0D. Thus, it suffices to prove that
for any start distance d0 and any strategy the expected number of rounds of game G is Ω
(
(log d0)
2
)
.
Now assume an arbitrary strategy SG for game G has been fixed. Then for every distance d strategy
SG induces a probability distribution βd on {1, . . . , d} as follows: SG dictates which node u with
‖u‖1 = d to choose. Node u has some grid neighbors of distance d− 1 from 0D and one long range
contact v, chosen at random on the basis of lrc distribution λ, as described before. One chooses
some neighbor v of u that minimizes ‖v‖1, and advances by d− ‖v‖1 ( ≥ 1) to the new state ‖v‖1.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ d, βd(i) is defined as the probability that the progress d−min{d− 1, ‖v‖1} is equal to
i.
Now we can describe how, given a strategy SG for game G, the game G played with SG may be
simulated by a budget game GB played with a strategy SB. The initial budget is some constant
B0 (independent of SG; value to be determined later). The initial distance is d0, as in game G.
When at distance d, the bet by the player of the budget game is the probability distribution βd on
{1, . . . , d} as defined in the previous paragraph. The effect is that in one round of GB the player
moves from state d to state d− i with probability βd(i), for 1 ≤ i ≤ d, exactly as in game G with
strategy SG. From this it is obvious that the expected number of rounds game GB needs to finish
is exactly the same as in game G with strategy SG.
Note, however, that before we can say that GB is a budget game in the technical sense, so that
the results of Section 2 can be applied, we have to make sure that the defining constraints on the
probability distributions βd used in the bets of GB are satisfied. In a round in which one moves
from state d to state d− i, i ≥ 2, the budget shrinks by (i/d)3/2βd
(
(i/2, d]
)
. (For i = 1 the budget
remains unchanged.) For GB to be a genuine budget game it is sufficient that βd is always a valid
budget bet, i. e., that constraints (B1) and (B2) on the probability distribution βd are satisfied
when state d is reached with remaining budget B in the budget game. If this is the case, then the
simulation GB of game G with strategy SG is a legitimate budget game, and Theorem 1 can be
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applied.
In the following, we develop two lemmas which show that βd always satisfies (B1) and (B2) if the
constant starting budget B0 is large enough. This will then prove Theorem 6.
3.3. The budget suffices
The first lemma deals with property (B1); it implies that if in GB state d is reached and the
remaining budget is B, then B is large enough to accommodate the next bet.
Lemma 7 Let dk ∈ [1, d0) be a state that can be reached in game G after k rounds, i. e., there are
states dk < dk−1 < · · · < d1 < d0 and step sizes is = ds − ds+1, 0 ≤ s < k, such that βds(is) > 0.
Then for B0 ≥ 21,
B0 −
∑
0≤s<k
is>1
(
is
ds
)3/2
βds
(
(is/2, ds]
) ≥ 1. (16)
Note that in order to satisfy (B1) when at distance dk, it would even suffice that the remaining
budget is βdk
(
[2, dk]
)
, while our lower bound on the remaining budget is 1.
of Lemma 7: Suppose a node u with ‖u‖1 = du has a long range contact v with ‖v‖1 = dv < du.
By the triangle inequality, ‖v − u‖1 ≥ du−dv, and since dv < du, we have ‖v − u‖1 ≤ dv+du < 2du.
Thus, in game G in order to go from state d to some state in [0, d′], d′ ≤ d − 2, the node u with
‖u‖1 = d (which is chosen by the player) must have chosen a long range contact v such that
d− d′ ≤ ‖v − u‖1 < 2d. It follows that
βd
(
[d− d′, d]) ≤ λ([d− d′, 2d)) for any 1 ≤ d′ ≤ d− 2. (17)
We define λ(I) =
∑
i∈I λ(i) for any set I ⊆ N. It suffices to show that
B0 −
∑
0≤s<k
is>1
(
is
ds
)3/2
λ
(
(is/2, 2ds)
) ≥ 1.
We have
∑
0≤s<k
is>1
(
is
ds
)3/2
λ
(
(is/2, 2ds)
)
=
∑
0≤s<k
is>1
(
is
ds
)3/2 ∑
is/2<j<2ds
λ(j)

=
∑
2≤j<2d0
λ(j) ·
 ∑
0≤s<k:
1≤is/2<j<2ds
(
is
ds
)3/2 .
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Since
∑
2≤j<2d0 λ(j) ≤ 1, it suffices to show for every j ∈ [2, 2d0) that
B0 − 1 ≥
∑
0≤s<k:
1≤is/2<j<2ds
(
is
ds
)3/2
. (18)
Fix j ∈ [2, 2d0) arbitrarily. For ` ∈
[
0, blog dc] let S(`) be the set of indices s ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} such
that
1 ≤ is/2 < j < 2ds and ds ∈ (d0/2`+1, d0/2`].
Then
c` :=
∑
s∈S(`)
(
is
ds
)3/2
≤
(
2`+1
d0
)3/2 ∑
s∈S(`)
is
3/2. (19)
Let s0 be the smallest index in S(`), i. e., state ds0 is reached in the budget game before any of the
step sizes is, s ∈ S(`), are applied. Since all step sizes is, s ∈ S(`), can still be subtracted from ds0
without reaching state 0, we have
∑
s∈S(`) is < ds0 ≤ d0/2`. In addition, is < 2j for all s ∈ S(`), so
by convexity of the function x 7→ x3/2,∑
s∈S(`)
is
3/2 <
d0/2
`
2j
· (2j)3/2 = d0
2`
· (2j)1/2.
Using this in (19) yields
c` ≤ 4 ·
(
j · 2
`
d0
)1/2
.
Now note that S(`) = ∅ and thus c` = 0 for d0/2` ≤ j/2, i. e., for ` ≥ log(d0/j) + 1. Hence,
∑
0≤s≤k:
1≤is/2<j<2ds
(
is
ds
)3/2
=
∑
0≤`≤log d
c` ≤
∑
0≤`<log(d0/j)+1
4 ·
(
j · 2
`
d0
)1/2
≤ 4 ·
(
j
d0
)1/2
·
∑
0≤`<log(d0/j)+1
2`/2 < 4 ·
(
j
d0
)1/2
· (
√
2)log(d0/j)+2 − 1√
2− 1
≤ 4 ·
(
j
d0
)1/2
· 2 · (d0/j)
1/2
√
2− 1 < 20.
This proves (7) for B0 ≥ 21, and thus the lemma.
3.4. A geometry lemma
It remains to show that the probability distributions βd that arise in the simulation of game G by
GB satisfy condition (B2). As before, let d
∗ = d− bd/2c; recall that (d/2, d] = [d− d∗ + 1, d], a set
of size d∗.
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Lemma 8 For all distances d ≥ 3 and all 1 ≤ j ≤ d∗,
βd
(
[d− j + 1, d]) ≤ 2j
d∗
· βd([d− d∗ + 1, d]).
For w ∈ ZD the the Manhattan ball with radius t around w, which is {x ∈ ZD | ‖x− w‖1 ≤ t}, is
denoted by Bw,t, and the Manhattan sphere with radius t around w, which is {x ∈ ZD | ‖x−w‖1 =
t}, is denoted by Sw,t.
Recall how βd is defined. The player in game G chooses a node u with ‖u‖1 = d. The lrc distribution
λ is used to choose some distance r; afterwards the long range contact v itself is chosen uniformly
at random from Su,r. It is obvious that it is sufficient to prove the inequality in Lemma 8 under
the condition that u and r are fixed. Note that the jump distance i = d − ‖v‖1 is in [d − j + 1, d]
if and only if ‖v‖1 ≤ j − 1, which means that v is in the Hamming ball B0,j−1. The jump distance
is in [d− d∗ + 1, d] if and only if ‖v‖1 ≤ d∗ − 1. We can restrict out attention to lrc lengths r with
which one can reach at least one such point v. Because on Su,r the uniform distribution is used, for
proving Lemma 8 it is sufficient to show the following.
Lemma 9 Let u ∈ ZD with ‖u‖ = d, and let d∗ = d− bd/2c. Assume that Su,r intersects B0,d∗−1.
Then for 1 ≤ j ≤ d∗ the following holds:
|B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r|
|B0,d∗−1 ∩ Su,r| ≤
2j
d∗
.
In words: If j ≤ d∗, then among the set of points on a sphere with radius r around u that are
strictly closer to the origin than d∗ not more than a fraction of 2j/d∗ is strictly closer to the origin
than j.
Note. Assume D = 2. With u on the x1-axis one can achieve that 2j−1 points are in B0,j−1∩Su,r
and d∗ + j points are in B0,d∗−1 ∩ Su,r. Assuming d∗ is large and j is small shows that the factor 2
in the lemma is best possible.
Proof. We start with some preliminary remarks. From Su,r ∩ B0,d∗−1 6= ∅ it follows that d ≤
r + d∗ − 1 = r + d− bd/2c − 1, hence r ≥ bd/2c+ 1 ≥ d∗. If B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r = ∅, there is nothing to
show. So, if needed, we will assume that B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r 6= ∅.
A vertex (of Su,r) is an element of Su,r that maximizes or minimizes one of the components. There
are 2D vertices; they have the form u± (0, . . . , 0, r, 0, . . . , 0), with exactly one nonzero component
in the second summand. It is easy to see that B0,d∗−1 can contain at most one of these vertices:
two vertices have Manhattan distance exactly 2r, but two points in B0,d∗−1 cannot be further apart
than 2(d∗ − 1), which is smaller than 2r.
If B0,d∗−1 contains one vertex w, the intersection B0,d∗−1 ∩Su,r does not change if u is moved away
from w along the line that connects w and u, and r is increased accordingly. The same is true if
B0,d∗−1 does not contain a vertex at all. We see that the statement we need to prove does not really
depend on r and u, only on the shape of the intersection B0,d∗−1∩Su,r. A moment’s thought shows
that is sufficient to show the following (and apply it for d∗ = i).
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Claim: Consider two balls B0,i−1 and B0,j−1 around the origin, with 1 ≤ j ≤ i. Assume that some
sphere Su,r intersects B0,i−1 in such a way that B0,i−1 contains at most one vertex of Su,r. Then
Q = Q(i, j, u, r) =
|B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r|
|B0,i−1 ∩ Su,r| ≤
2j
i
.
The claim is proved by induction on D.
Basis: D = 2.
For symmetry reasons we may assume that the leftmost (“westernmost”) vertex of Su,r is in B0,i−1,
if any. We may further assume that r is large enough so that certain manipulations with Su,r are
possible without another vertex coming close to B0,i−1. We may assume that B0,j−1 ∩Su,r 6= ∅ and
2j < i, since otherwise the claim is trivially true. We consider some cases.
Case 1: B0,i−1 does not contain a vertex of Su,r. — Then the intersection B0,i−1 ∩Su,r is a straight
line with i or i − 1 points. The intersection B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r is either empty (and hence Q = 0) or a
straight line with j or j − 1 points. Hence Q ≤ j/(i− 1) ≤ (j + 1)/i ≤ 2j/i.
Figure 1: Case 1. B0,i−1 (large ball) is green/lighter, B0,j−1 (small ball) is blue/darker, the bent line is a
part of Su,r (red). |B0,i−1 ∩ Su,r| = 7 = i− 1 and |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| = 3 = j.
Case 2. B0,i−1 contains the leftmost vertex of Su,r, but this vertex is not in B0,j−1. — Then the
intersection B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r is a straight line with j or j − 1 points. We move u parallel to this
line until the leftmost vertex of Su,r moves out of B0,i−1. This change decreases the denominator
|B0,i−1 ∩ Su,r|, but leaves the numerator |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| unchanged. Applying Case 1 yields the
desired inequality.
Case 3: The leftmost vertex of Su,r is a point (z, 0) on the x1-axis, inside B0,j−1. Then −j < z < j.
Let y = z − 1 + j, hence 0 ≤ y ≤ 2j − 2. Then |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| is either 2j − y − 2 = j − z − 1 or 1
more than this; in any case we have |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| ≤ j − z. Similarly, |B0,i−1 ∩ Su,r| ≥ i − z − 1.
Hence Q ≤ (j − z)/(i − z − 1), which is a number < 1 (since 2j < i, hence j < i − 1). Increasing
numerator and denominator by the same summand increases the fraction, hence
Q ≤ j − z
i− z − 1 ≤
j − z
i− z − 1 ≤
j + j
i+ j − 1 ≤
2j
i
.
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Figure 2: Case 2. B0,i−1, B0,j−1, and Su,r as in Fig. 1. Moving Su,r to the southwest until the vertex is
outside B0,j−1 does not change Su,r ∩B0,j−1 and makes the intersection with Su,r ∩B0,i−1 smaller.
Figure 3: Case 3. B0,i−1, B0,j−1, and Su,r as in Fig. 1. Here: i = 8, j = 4. The leftmost vertex of Su,r
is (−1, 0) = (z, 0). Hence y = 2. |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| = j − z = 5, while |B0,i−1 ∩ Su,r| = i − z = 9. We have
5/9 < 8/8 = 2j/i.
Case 4: The leftmost vertex (z, z′) of Su,r is inside B0,j−1, but not on the x1-axis. Assume z′ > 0, so
it is above the x1 axis. Move u in southwest direction until it hits the x1-axis. This means that the
leftmost vertex moves to (z − z′, 0). These changes increase both |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| and |B0,i−1 ∩ Su,r|
by z′, hence Q increases. Applying Case 3 yields the claim also in this case.
Induction step: D > 2.
As induction hypothesis we assume that the claim is true for D − 1. We cut ZD into hyperplanes
(“layers”) Ls = {(s, x2, . . . , xD) | x2, . . . , xD ∈ Z}, for s ∈ Z. If j−|s| ≤ 0, the intersection B0,j−1∩
Su,r ∩ Ls of our configuration with layer Ls is empty, so it does not contribute to |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r|,
and we may ignore this layer. Assume |s| < j. Intersecting Ls with B0,i−1, B0,j−1, and Su,r, and
ignoring dimension 1 gives balls with radius i−|s|−1 and j−|s|−1 around the origin and a sphere
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Figure 4: Case 4. B0,i−1, B0,j−1, and Su,r as in Fig. 1. Moving Su,r in southwest direction until the leftmost
vertex hits the x1-axis increases |B0,j−1 ∩ Su,r| (by 1) and does not change |(B0,i−1 −B0,j−1) ∩ Su,r|.
Su′,r′ , all in ZD−1. The crucial observation is that only one vertex of Su′,r′ can lie in B0,i−1. The
induction hypothesis yields that restricted to Ls the ratio between points in B0,j−1 and B0,i−1 is
Q(i−|s|, j−|s|, u′, r′) ≤ 2(j−|s|)/(i−|s|) ≤ 2j/i. Summing this over all layers Ls, for −j < s < j,
yields that Q(i, j, u, r) ≤ 2ji .
This ends the induction step, and the proof of the claim, and the proof of the lemma.
4. Conclusion
We presented the first lower bound for greedy routing in augmented D-dimensional grids and tori
for D ≥ 2, for any uniform and isotropic augmenting distribution. Together with the tight lower
bound for rings and lines [4], this settles the question whether for all dimensions D the inverse
D-th power distribution is the optimal uniform and isotropic augmenting distribution for greedy
routing in Kleinberg’s small world graph model. It seems to us that the new lower bound technique
presented here is easier to understand than the one applied in [4] for the one-dimensional case. The
analysis of budget games yields interesting insights into the reasons why faster greedy routing is
not possible. We also think that budget games are an interesting concept in their own right.
We believe that it is not hard to extend our lower bound technique to prove a lower bound for the
greedy diameter of the line (i. e., to obtain the same result as in [3]). To obtain a tight lower bound
for greedy routing on the ring between two randomly chosen nodes as in [4] may not be as easy,
but we conjecture that it is possible.
Our lower bounds hold regardless whether every node has one or k independently chosen long
range contacts, as long as k is a constant. For super-constant k this is not clear. For k = O(log n)
and any constant D ≥ 1, greedy routing on the D-dimensional torus or grid augmented with the
inverse D-th power distribution takes only O
(
(log n)2/k
)
time. It seems likely that our lower bound
technique can be generalized somehow to show that this is optimal for all uniform and isotropic
augmenting distributions, but a full proof seems to require significant additional effort.
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A. Additional Proof
Claim 10 For all z ≥ 1 and x ∈ [0, 12 ] we have
ln(z(1− x))2 ≥ ln2(z)− 3x(ln z).
Proof: The claim is obvious for z = 1, so we may assume z > 1. Note that ln(1− x) ≥ −3x/2 for
all x ∈ [0, 12 ]. This is immediate for the boundary cases x = 0 and x = 1/2 and thus follows for all
x ∈ (0, 12) since the function x 7→ ln(1− x) is concave. Hence,
ln2(z(1− x)) = ln2 z + 2(ln z)(ln(1− x)) + ln2(1− x) ≥ ln2 z − 3x(ln z).
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